
Terrorism

terrorismens orsaker

INLEDNING



Terrorist eller frihetskämpe, befrielsekamp eller brottslighet?

Nedan har jag hämtat en rad rapporter och annat. Dessa rapporter är primärt hämtade från Internet. Rapporterna fokuserar kring vad som orsakar terrorism. En central fråga är i vilken utsträckning fattigdom spelar någon roll. Det var ju också temat för vårt rollspel.

Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?

“Countries in an intermediate range of political rights experience a greater risk of terrorism than countries either with a very high degree of political rights or than severely authoritarian countries with very low levels of political rights.”

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, politicians and policy experts drew a quick and intuitive line between terrorism and poverty. Much of the existing academic literature on conflict suggested that poverty increased the likelihood of political coups and civil war, so conflating terrorism with poor economic conditions seemed logical. Indeed, just a few weeks following 9/11, then U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick spoke out on the need to liberalize international trade – and thus reduce poverty – as a means to fight terrorism.

In *Poverty, Political Freedom, and the Roots of Terrorism* (NBER Working Paper No. 10859) Alberto Abadie explores this link in greater detail and finds that the risk of terrorism is not significantly higher for poorer countries, once other country-specific characteristics are con-

sidered. In particular, Abadie finds that a country's level of political freedom better explains the presence of terrorism.

Unlike other recent studies on the causes of terrorism, Abadie's work explores not only transnational instances of terrorism but also domestic ones. This difference is telling: In 2003, the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base reported only 240 cases of transnational terrorism compared to 1,536 instances of domestic terrorism. Furthermore, Abadie suggests that the determinants of transnational and domestic terrorism may differ. "Much of modern-day transnational terrorism seems to generate from grievances against rich countries," he writes. "In addition, in some cases terrorist groups may decide to attack property or nationals of rich countries in order to gain international publicity. As a result, transnational terrorism may predominantly affect rich countries. The same is not necessarily true for domestic terrorism."

While many studies have relied on measures of terrorism-related casualties or terrorist incidences as a proxy for the risk of terrorism, Abadie uses country-level ratings on terrorist risk from the Global Terrorism Index of the World Market Research Center, an international risk-rating agency. The index assesses terrorism risk in 186 countries and territories. In order to measure poverty, Abadie uses World Bank data on per capita gross domestic product as well as the United Nations Human Development Index and or the Gini coefficient (a measure of country-level income inequality). He also uses Freedom House's political rights index as a measure of country-level political freedom and employs measures of linguistic, ethnic, and religious fractionalization. Finally, he includes data on climate and geography, since it is well known that certain geographic characteristics – such as being land-locked or in an area that is difficult to access – may offer safe haven to terrorist groups and facilitate training.

After controlling for the level of political rights, fractionalization, and geography, Abadie concludes that per capita national income is not significantly associated with terrorism. He finds, though, that lower levels of political rights are linked to higher levels of terrorism. Countries with the highest levels of political rights are also the countries that suffer the lowest levels of terrorism. However, the relationship between the level of political rights and terrorism is not a simple linear one. Countries in an intermediate range of political rights experience a greater risk of terrorism than countries either with a very high degree of political rights or than severely authoritarian countries with very low levels of political rights.

Why this relationship? Abadie offers two possibilities. "On the one hand, the repressive practices commonly adopted by autocratic regimes to eliminate political dissent may help [keep] terrorism at bay," he explains. "On the other hand, intermediate levels of political

freedom are often experienced during times of political transitions, when governments are weak, political instability is elevated, so conditions are favorable for the appearance of terrorism." Finally, this study reveals that geographic factors – such as measures of average elevation, tropical weather, and country area – are also powerful predictors of terrorism.

Bekämpa terrorns underliggande orsaker

Debattartikeln har publicerats i Västerbottens-Kuriren, Hallandsposten, Skånska Dagbladet, Nerikes Allehanda, Norrtelje Tidning, Eskilstuna-Kuriren och Bohuslänningen med Dals Dagblad.

Terrorattentaten i London var en fruktansvärd påminnelse om hur globala, urskillningslösa och svårlösta dagens våldsamma konflikter är. Ofta är aktörerna förblindade av hat, hämndlystnad och maktbegär. Lika ofta leder våld till mer våld. En spiral som inte bara skapar omedelbart lidande. Den skapar även omfattande fattigdom och armod.

Enorma resurser och ansträngningar satsas varje år för väpnade insatser och på forskning för att ta fram allt dödligare vapen och stridsteknik. Samtidigt glöms det ofta bort att arbetet för utveckling och mot fattigdom är viktiga pusselbitar i den långsiktiga kampen för att skapa varaktig fred i världens konflikthärddar.

Det är dags att biståndsaktörerna organisationer och stater inser vilken enorm potential de har inom detta område. Biståndet kan arbeta med de underliggande orsakerna till konflikt, exempelvis brist på demokrati och god samhällsstyrning. Genom att bidra till demokratisk utveckling, ökat välstånd och en större respekt för mänskliga rättigheter kan riskerna för extremism och terror minskas.

Sidas arbete runt om i världen sker till 75 procent i länder där krig påverkar människors möjligheter att utvecklas och ta sig ur fattigdom. Stödet som vi svenskar är med och betalar kan ofta vara avgörande för att skapa förutsättningar för fredlig utveckling. I exempelvis Moçambique har Sveriges stöd varit en del av att skapa ett idag relativt stabilt land som utvecklas i rätt riktning. Stödet har givits under de drygt tio år som gått sedan kriget tog slut. De humanitära insatserna under kriget följdes av långsiktiga insatser inom bland annat utbildning, hälsa och demokratiutveckling.

Det breda och mångsidiga biståndet har en potential att påverka de underliggande orsakerna till krig och konflikt. Biståndet kan stödja direkta insatser för dialog och ökad samverkan mellan olika samhällsgrupper, men även ett lands demokratiska och ekonomiska reformer.

Reformer som kan skapa förutsättningar för ökad legitimitet för staten och ge möjligheter för

fattiga människor att få arbete. En viktig del i att arbeta för fredlig utveckling är att minska rekryteringsbasen till väpnade grupper, att hitta alternativ för speciellt unga människor.

De tragiska händelserna i London och den våg av terrorism som följt efter den 11 september 2001 visar också att hopplöshet och utanförskap är en underliggande faktor till terrorism. Här kan utvecklingssamarbetet skapa alternativ via utbildning och arbete och därigenom också motverka terror och våldsamma konflikter.

Kampen mot orättvisorna i världen är oerhört viktig. Cirka 1,1 miljarder människor i lever i extrem fattigdom. Den nöd som dessa människor befinner sig i är ofattbar för de flesta av oss i de rika delarna av världen. För hur kan vi förstå vad det betyder att leva på mindre än en dollar per dag? Kan vi över huvud taget föreställa oss hur det är att leva med kronisk hunger, att nekas sjukvård och att tvingas dricka förorenat smutsigt vatten och sakna sanitet? Denna fattigdom skördar åtta miljoner människoliv varje år. Och krig leder till ökad fattigdom och drabbar de fattigaste hårdast.

Vi måste ställa tydligare krav på organisationerna och samarbetsländerna som får pengar till insatser att freds- och säkerhetsaspekterna finns med. För att lyfta fram dessa aspekter i det svenska biståndet har Sida därför nyligen inrättat en ny enhet: Enheten för fred och säkerhet i utvecklingssamarbetet.

Freds- och konfliktforskningen har visat att för att få en varaktig och bred effekt av biståndsinsatser måste de redan från början analysera vad just deras projekt kan ha för effekter på konfliktodynamiken.

Ett exempel på biståndets roll och långsiktiga effekt på säkerheten i ett land är när soldater ska demobiliseras och avväpnas. De två stegen i en längre process är relativt enkla och får ofta tillräckligt med resurser. Det är relativt enkelt att samla in och förstöra vapen. Den tredje och ofta avgörande delen, integrationen av ex-soldater tillbaka till sina samhällen, är ofta underfinansierad. När ex-soldater inte kan finna arbete är vägen inte lång tillbaka till vapnen, som ofta gav åtminstone mat för dagen och en viss respekt.

För att kunna ge effektivt stöd till fredsprocesser mitt i brinnande krig måste även en ökad samordning ske mellan oss statliga givare, FN, den medlande diplomatin och civila samhällets organisationer. De enskilda organisationernas roll är otroligt viktig och kan oftast inte ersättas med FN eller diplomatisk medling. En viktig slutsats från fredsforskningen är just att aktörerna kompletterar varandra, alla behövs för att freden ska få fäste. Därför bör insatserna och de olika aktörerna samordnas bättre.

En stor konferens hålls nu i sommar på FN:s högkvarter i New York 19-21 juli, med främsta målet att just ha en bättre samsyn och vision inom fredsarbetet. Det är kulmen på ett antal regionala konferenser runt om i världen, där organisationerna tillsammans skapat en ökad samsyn för deras roll i fredsarbetet. Samarbetet mellan FN:s olika organ och de enskilda organisationerna i länderna är högt på agendan.

Den internationellt antagna Paris-deklarationen sätter press på oss givare att bättre koordinera oss. De länder som ger bistånd bör ge bättre möjligheter för länderna själva att bestämma över biståndets inriktning, i dialog med oss givare.

Potentialen för biståndet att ha en positiv effekt på strävan efter fred och säkerhet finns där. Vi måste utnyttja den potentialen för att skapa hållbara fredslösningar, bygga livskraftiga demokratier och minska riskerna för framtida våldsamma konflikter.

Björn Holmberg, chef Sidas enhet för fred och säkerhet

Henrik Mungenast, rådgivare Sidas enhet för fred och säkerhet

FN-rapport 2005

Vårt gemensamma ansvar

TERRORISM

Terrorism utgör ett hot mot respekten för mänskliga rättigheter, rättsstaten, krigets lagar för skydd av civila och fredliga lösningar på konflikter. Terrorismen hämtar sin näring ur fattigdom, desperation, politiskt förtryck och olika typer av extremism.

EXPERTPANELENS FÖRSLAG

- FN bör ta ledningen i kampen mot terrorismen och utarbeta en enhetlig strategi som riktar in sig på terrorismens grundorsaker. Bakomliggande orsaker till terrorism, som fattigdom, social misär och organiserad brottslighet, måste pressas tillbaka.
- De stater som inte undertecknat och ratificerat de tolv existerande konventionerna mot terrorism uppmanas att göra det och att anta OECD:s rekommendationer mot finansiering av terrorister.

- FN:s antiterroristenhet behöver få mer resurser för att bättre kunna samordna samarbetet mellan länder. FN bör inrätta en särskild stödfond som kan användas för att motverka terrorism.
- Ett hinder i FN:s arbete mot terrorismen är att staterna inte lyckats enas om en konvention mot terrorism med en klar och tydlig definition av vad terrorism är. Panelen föreslår att terrorism definieras som varje handling vilken är ämnad att döda eller kroppsligt allvarligt skada civila eller icke-stridande då syftet med en sådan handling är i grunden politiskt.
- Säkerhetsrådet bör ta fram en plan över vilka sanktioner som ska kunna införas mot stater som inte följer säkerhetsrådets resolutioner mot terrorism.

THE ECONOMICS AND THE EDUCATION OF SUICIDE BOMBERS.

Does Poverty Cause Terrorism?

by Alan B. Krueger & Jitka Maleckova (i The new Republic)

That investment in education is critical for economic growth, improved health, and social progress is beyond question. That poverty is a scourge that the international aid community and industrialized countries should work to eradicate is also beyond question. There is also no doubt that terrorism is a scourge of the contemporary world. What is less clear, however, is whether poverty and low education are root causes of terrorism.

In the aftermath of the tragic events of September 11, several prominent observers and policymakers have called for increased aid and educational assistance as a means for ending terrorism. "We fight against poverty," President George W. Bush has declared, "because hope is an answer to terror." But a careful review of the evidence provides little reason for optimism that a reduction in poverty or an increase in educational attainment would, by themselves, meaningfully reduce international terrorism. Any connection between poverty, education, and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak. Instead of viewing terrorism as a direct response to low market opportunities or lack of education, we suggest it is more accurately viewed as a response to political conditions and long-standing feelings of indignity and frustration (perceived or real) that have little to do with economics.

An understanding of the causes of terrorism is essential if an effective strategy is to be crafted to combat it. Drawing a false and unjustified connection between poverty and terrorism is potentially quite dangerous, as the international aid community may lose interest in providing support to developing nations when the imminent threat of terrorism recedes, much as sup-

port for development waned in the aftermath of the Cold War; and connecting foreign aid with terrorism risks the possibility of humiliating many people in less developed countries, who are implicitly told that they receive aid only to prevent them from committing acts of terror. Moreover, premising foreign aid on the threat of terrorism could create perverse incentives in which some groups are induced to engage in terrorism to increase their prospects of receiving aid. In our view, alleviating poverty is reason enough to pressure economically advanced countries to provide more aid than they are currently giving. Falsely connecting terrorism to poverty serves only to deflect attention from the real roots of terrorism.

To make any headway investigating the determinants of terrorism, one must have a working definition of terrorism. This is a notoriously difficult task. More than one hundred diplomatic and scholarly definitions of the term exist. The types of activities by various groups that are considered terrorist acts differ substantially across the definitions. The term "terrorism" has also evolved over time. It was first used in a political context during the French Revolution, when it was reserved for accusations against those who, like Robespierre, made use of violence in the name of the state. By the late nineteenth century, however, Russian and French anarchists proudly used the word "terrorism" to describe their violent endeavors against the state. A part of the difficulty in defining terrorism is that there are valid disputes as to which party is a legitimate government. During World War II, for example, the German occupation forces labeled members of the French Resistance terrorists.

A range of possible definitions exists. The State Department, which acknowledges that no single definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance, seems to have captured what is considered terrorism by many governments and international organizations. Since 1983, it has employed this definition for statistical and analytical purposes: "The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term 'international terrorism' means terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country." The State Department also specifies that "the term noncombatant is interpreted to include, in addition to civilians, military personnel who at the time of the incident are unarmed and/or not on duty.... We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site, such as bombings against U.S. bases in the Persian Gulf, Europe, or elsewhere." The rub, of course, is that the definitions of "subnational" and "military hostilities" leaves much latitude for disagreement.

The definitions of terrorism used by scholars, by contrast, tend to place more emphasis on the intention of terrorists to cause fear and terror among a targeted population that is considerably larger than the actual victims of their attacks, and to influence the views of that larger audience. The actual victim of the violence is thus not the main target of the terrorist act. Scholarly definitions often also include nation-states as potential perpetrators of terrorism.

Rather than dogmatically adhere to one definition, we have analyzed involvement in or support for activities that, at least when judged by some parties, constitute terrorism. Still, in the incidents that we have analyzed, the line between terrorism and resistance is often blurred. At the least, all of the cases we examine could be thought of as involving politically motivated violence. Moreover, it is reassuring that our main conclusions appear to hold across a varying set of circumstances, cultures, and countries. (We do not examine state terrorism because we suspect that the process underlying participation in state terrorism is quite different from the process underlying sub-state terrorism, and would involve a different type of analysis. We do not dispute that state terrorism exists, and that it has at times generated sub-state terrorism as a response.)

In economics, it is natural to analyze participation in terrorism in the framework of occupational choice. As is conventional in economics, involvement in terrorism is viewed as a rational decision, depending on the benefits, costs, and risks involved in engagement in terrorism compared with other activities. Not surprisingly, the standard rational-choice framework does not yield an unambiguous answer to the question of whether higher income and more education would reduce participation in terrorism.

In this context, we have also reviewed evidence on "hate crimes," which can be viewed as a close cousin to terrorism in that the target of an offense is selected because of his or her group identity, not because of his or her individual behavior, and because the effect of both is to wreak terror in a greater number of people than those directly affected by the violence. A consensus is emerging in the social science literature that the incidence of hate crimes, such as lynchings of African Americans or violence against Turks in Germany, bears little relation to economic conditions.

Most significantly, we have considered data from a public-opinion poll conducted in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR). In December 2001, Palestinians were asked whether they supported attacks on Israeli civilian and military targets, and about whether they considered certain incidents acts of terrorism. Breaking down the data by education and occupation indicates that support for violence aga-

inst Israeli targets is widespread in the Palestinian population, and at least as great among those with higher education and higher living standards as it is among the unemployed and the illiterate. Similarly, a review of the incidence of major terrorist acts over time in Israel, and an analysis that relates the number of terrorist acts each year to the rate of economic growth in that year or in the recent past, yields the same skepticism about the idea that poverty is a cause of terrorism.

The data on participation in and support for political violence, militancy, and terrorism that we have examined are meager, often indirect, and possibly nonrepresentative. In addition, participation in terrorist activities may be highly context-specific, and we have examined terrorism, militancy, and politically motivated violence in a small number of settings primarily in the Middle East. Consequently, our results must be considered tentative and exploratory. Yet we are not aware of compelling evidence that points in the opposite direction from what we have found. In light of our results, we would urge intellectuals and policymakers to exercise caution in presuming that poverty and education have a direct and causal impact on terrorism.

II.

A simple view of terrorism is that participation in terrorism is akin to participation in crime in general. Economists have a well-developed and empirically successful theory of participation in criminal activities. As emphasized by Gary Becker, individuals should choose to allocate their time between working in the legal job market or working in criminal activities in such a way that maximizes their utility. After accounting for the risk of being caught and penalized, the size of the penalty, and any stigma or moral distress associated with involvement in crime, those who receive higher income from criminal activities would choose involvement in crime. According to this model, crime increases as one's market wage falls relative to the rewards associated with crime, and decreases if the risk of being apprehended after committing a crime, or the penalty for being convicted of a crime, rises. Available evidence suggests that individuals are more likely to commit property crimes if they have lower wages or less education; but the occurrence of violent crimes, including murders, is typically found to be unrelated to economic opportunities.

Some economists, notably William Landes, Todd Sandler, and Walter Enders, have applied the economic model of crime to transnational terrorism. They focus on how an increase in penalties and law enforcement influences the incentive to partake in terrorist activities. But the economic model yields few concrete predictions insofar as the relationship between mar-

ket opportunities and participation in terrorism is concerned, because participation in terrorist acts by individuals with different characteristics depends on the probability that participation will bring about the desired political change, as well as the differential payoff for the various groups associated with achieving the terrorists' desired aims versus the penalties associated with failure. It is possible, for example, that well-educated individuals will disproportionately participate in terrorist groups if they think that they will assume leadership positions if they succeed, or if they identify more strongly with the goals of the terrorist organization than less-educated individuals.

Other important considerations include the relative pay of skilled and unskilled individuals for participation in terrorist organizations and how it compares to relative pay in the legal sector, and the selection of particular terrorists by terrorist organizations. Bill Keller recently reported in *The New York Times* that Iraq decided in March to increase the payment to families of suicide bombers in the West Bank and Gaza from \$10,000 to \$25,000. In the month after that decision, suicide bombings increased, though it is unclear whether the connection is causal.

Even before the increase in the payment to families of suicide bombers, there was a large supply of willing suicide bombers, as Nasra Hassan, a relief worker for the United Nations, reported last year in *The New Yorker*. Between 1996 and 1999, Hassan interviewed nearly two hundred fifty militants and associates of militants involved in the Palestinian cause, including failed suicide bombers, the families of deceased bombers, and those who trained and prepared suicide bombers for their missions. One Hamas leader whom Hassan interviewed remarked: "Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to be sent [on suicide missions]. It is difficult to select only a few." A senior member of the al-Qassam Brigades said: "The selection process is complicated by the fact that so many wish to embark on this journey of honor. When one is selected, countless others are disappointed." Thus, the demand side is also part of the equation.

With a queue of willing participants, how do terrorist or militant groups choose their suicide bombers? A planner for Islamic Jihad explained to Hassan that his group scrutinizes the motives of a potential bomber to be sure that the individual is committed to carrying out the task. Now, a high level of educational attainment is probably a signal of one's commitment to a cause, as well as of one's ability to prepare for an assignment and carry it out. For this reason, the stereotype of suicide bombers being drawn from the ranks of those who are so impoverished that they have nothing to live for may be wildly incorrect. This interpretation is also consistent with another of Hassan's observations about suicide bombers: "None of them were

uneducated, desperately poor, simple-minded, or depressed. Many were middle class and, unless they were fugitives, held paying jobs. More than half of them were refugees from what is now Israel. Two were the sons of millionaires."

Causes of terrorism

Marijke Keet

A shorter and easier-to-read version of a paragraph of my MA dissertation "Terrorism and Game Theory: coalitions, negotiations, and audience costs", downloadable in full here (in pdf).

Research literature on causal factors and diverse goals that drives people to resort to carry out terrorist acts is inconclusive. How these two are connected can be a matter of debate: are researched causes derived from terrorists' manifestos, implicitly or explicitly worded goals, or are living conditions perceived as unjust and not decent and therefore its goals may be inferred, or a mere conjecture? Multiple reasons are listed here, of which some seem to be more applicable than others, and some others tend to go together for identification of more or less convincing causal factors.

Ethnicity, nationalism/separatism

Probably the most contested cause of terrorism is an aggrieved group resorting to violence for nationalist or separatist reasons; depending on one's point of view, this can be considered as resistance against an (external) oppressor. Thus far, only Mahatma Gandhi and his followers of the freedom movement have managed to liberate themselves from foreign occupation by peaceful means (Drewermann, 2001), whereas in most other (previously) colonised states "nationalist movements commonly turned to terrorism", it being "the resort of an extremist faction of this broader movement" within an ethnic minority (Crenshaw, 1981:383). Williams (1994) provides an overview on the relation between ethnic minorities and the likelihood of conflict, for example to establish or assert language rights, religious beliefs and symbols (1994:59), but he also includes factors like "civil and political rights and privileges, ..., regional-ethnic parity in the economy... What then generates perceptions of unfairness is competition/rivalry when an ethny is subordinated or disadvantaged in economic opportunity, social status, political voice and rights, or cultural expressions." (Williams, 1994:59)

However, the cited factors are not unique for ethnic minorities. To generalize it further, ethnic conflict arises from a "complex combination" of class, inequality, political opportunity, mobilization resources and "ethnic strength" (Williams, 1994:49). How can 'ethnic strength' be measured, and to what extent is ethnicity (and related nationalist separatist movements) a constructed concept? (Nevertheless, the idea works for mobilizing people). One note of caution on the importance of ethnic conflict is appropriate. Fearon and Laitin (1996)

assessed the ratio of actual versus potential communal violence in Africa from independence through 1979, ranging from 0.0005 for actual ethnic violence to 0.0028 (or 0.28%) for ethnic civil war, thereby claiming that incidence of ethnic conflict is hugely overestimated due to research bias. Worded more positively: most ethnic groups live in peace with each other.

Poverty and economic disadvantage, globalisation

A more important factor may be the social stratification Williams is referring to and inequalities in the distribution of scarce resources. Extensive contemporary media and literature simplify this to the poverty argument (e.g. Murphy (2001) and Kristof (2002)): when a group is absolutely or relatively deprived they rebel. A comprehensive evaluation of the extant literature on the validity of this argument, the Economic Inequality - Political Conflict (EI-PC) hypothesis, has been carried out by Lichbach (1989), who came to the conclusion that "EI-PC studies have produced an equivocal answer about the EI-PC nexus" (p440) regardless the research angle (statistics, rational actor and deprived actor paradigms). Problems Lichbach identified were notions on the lack of exactly defined economic factors influencing the decision to resort to political conflict and the "tolerance for inequality" (p452), according to the Rational Actor (RA) approach shifting to behavioural dissent only when absolute poverty is present, the Deprived Actor (DA) scientific research program's undefined additional "intermediate psychological processes" (p459), and another not fully explored factor of the (insignificant) influence of collective action (p465). Say, one dismisses the inconclusive research results and assumes that it is a (major) cause fuelling terrorism - proof by contradiction: roughly 15% of the population consumes 85% of the resources, UN statistics show that citizens in the Third World are worse off now than 30 years ago, while a small faction in those countries enriched themselves, i.e. RA and DA are both present as well as the statistics. If either one of them is true, the West ought to be continuously subject to terrorist acts by (a small group representing) people from these Third World countries. But there is no huge mass uprising of the vast majority of the world population against the few in Western states, nor continuous terrorist attacks carried out by Third World citizens against the West. In fact, the amount of terrorist incidents declined in the 1990s. (Refer to e.g. 'Patterns of Global Terrorism' publications, downloadable from the US State Department website at <http://www.usemb.se/terror/>).

Broadening the perspective to globalisation, Galtung (2002) blames the Third World - First World dichotomy as a new version of class conflict based on structural violence. This assertion in itself may provide an explanation as to why widespread social upheaval has not occurred. Proving injustice being done by structural violence is considerably more difficult than an

overt assault on a country or discrimination of a target group, and even if one succeeds in convincing one's own group, they will likely stumble upon resorting to terrorist methods, not possessing sufficient assets to purchase and develop so-called 'weapons of mass destruction'. This is an example of a wider gap between means and ends. Guelke (1995) explores globalisation, inequality and the Third World from another direction and explores the possible links between economic affluence and a stable liberal democracy, thereby assuming that it would reduce incidence of terrorism. However, at the same time he asserts that a liberal democracy "has proved little more successful than other forms of political systems in overcoming the relative weakness of the state in many Third World societies" (p135) and that economic development is a more important factor to maintain law and order. Guelke is more concerned with intra-Third World conflicts than world wide international terrorism as "there has been relatively little spill-over from political violence within Third World states into the international arena" (p142) and in addition to economic development, the possible effects a "debilitated" liberal democracy in Third World countries may induce and facilitate, but without formulating a sound conclusion on the matter either.

(non)democracy

The factor of democracy as an instigator or facilitator for terrorism deserves further exploration. A democratic government is supposed to represent the people and provide political means to voice grievances, hence essentially providing a sphere where terrorism has no place. For this reason, in theory, there 'cannot' be an aggrieved group that is not adequately represented; otherwise, it is a "violation of the doctrines of democracy and constitutionalism" (Wilkinson, 1977:232). In reality, this may not be the case: for example the 'second-class citizens' in the democratic Jewish state Israel (excluding non-Jewish citizens certain rights (Dworkin, 1997:222)). Such a situation would fit Wilkinson's assertion that political violence is morally justifiable in a democracy in two occasions: "Firstly, there is the case of the minority whose basic rights and liberties are denied or taken away by arbitrary action of the government or its agencies. ... Second when one minority is attacked by another minority and does not receive adequate protection from the state and its forces of law and order." (Wilkinson, 1977:40) and "Those who are the subjects of a liberal state, but who are not admitted to its rights of citizenship cannot be morally bound to obedience to the state. They are not bound by political obligation for they have not been accorded any rights by the state." (Wilkinson, 1977:39)

Arguably, based on these claims, one can say it is exactly absence of a 'correct' implementation of democratic ideals and not democracy sic.

However, a characteristic of democracies is their openness. Some, like Meyer (2002) and Khan (2003), consider this openness a major weakness of the system, and therefore a 'cause'. Openness in itself cannot be a cause, only maybe easing terrorists in their preparations and facilitating publicity in the relative absence of censorship, but not the 'change of mind-set' to resort to terrorism as a tool. Likewise the non-cause of the claims of the increase in ease of mobility and technology, put forward by for example Homer-Dixon (2002). It is conceivable to contend that Western states are as close to the democratic ideology as possible, but it is generally assumed the case, thereby invalidating Wilkinson's two occasions. Why then, have Western states not been free from internal terrorism? What might be a cause, is the so-called 'terror of the majority': the minority is represented and allowed to voice their grievances, but this is consistently not translated into desired policies because there are not sufficient votes to pass desired legislation.

Disaffected intelligentsia

Rubenstein elaborates another interesting aspect occurring in Western liberal democratic states in his book *Alchemists of Revolution* (1987), though not necessarily because of a hiatus in democratic governance. There are two points I would like to bring under attention. First, Rubenstein's thesis that the main cause of terrorism are disgruntled, disaffected, intelligentsia who are in a social and moral crisis unable to mobilize the masses. This is "a primary internal cause of terrorism, dictating to a degree its philosophy, tactics and consequences" (Rubenstein, 1987:xvii). Intellectuals, of the type of ambitious idealist, do not have a rebellious lower class to lead due to shifts from primary and manual work to the services sector, nor do they receive guidance from a creative upper class that they can follow. When rigid social stratification shatter hopes for social transformation, then the ingredients are present for a start or rise in terrorist activities in an attempt to reconnect with the masses who they claim to represent and aspire to lead. Examples: "...ever since the Russian intellectuals "invented" modern terrorism..." (Radu, 2001), referring to *Narodnaya Volya*, Wieviorka's "Disappointed, frustrated or unrealisable upward mobility" (1988:29); "middle-class alienation" (Kristof, 2002); "spoilt children of affluence" (Wilkinson, 1977:93); Crenshaw (1981); Williams (1994:65), and so forth. But now, 15 years after the book's publication, access to third level education (the 'democratisation of education') has increased to such an extend that it devalues degrees to a minimum standard for procuring a job. Is the degree graduate now the new (white collar) working class stuck in his/her cubicle? If true, then the 'gap' between the masses and intelligentsia is smaller at present, hence more likely to be bridge-able, and therefore less prone to induce ideas to resort to terrorism, thus at least weakening Rubenstein's view. The second aspect of Rubenstein's book is a broad discussion on the myriad of, predomi-

nantly leftist, political ideologies - indirectly the perceived cause being the undemocratic government, unfair capitalist system et al - but may simply be a failed revolution.

Dehumanisation

Opposite the concept of disaffected intelligentsia is the assertion that it is not intelligentsia, but simpleminded people who are easy to indoctrinate that are perceived to be 'the cause' (Rathbone and Rowley, 2002) prevalent in more recent popular literature. They, and others, are essentially trying to dehumanise terrorists, thereby confirming terrorist's core reasons they are fighting for: being heard, recognised and treated as equal human beings. In this context, Midgley (2002) has put forward an interesting explanation for the increased levels of dehumanisation: "a continuation of the frozen, abstract hatreds made possible by the cold war... this suspending of normal human relations is supposed to be just a temporary expedient ... The corrupt thing about the Cold War idea was that it legitimised acceptance of this evil as a normal, permanent condition of life. It domesticated tribal hatred."

Thus obfuscating the distinction between literal and metaphorical wars, where the negative mindset of people caused by the Cold War continues to live on, and feed, terrorism and the violent responses on terrorism, made possible by disregarding the idea that an opponent is a human being too. However, a closer examination of this argument reveals that the implied cause of the violence is within us, having internalised dehumanisation, not the 'illiterate stupid other'.

Religion

In line with either dehumanisation, or with previously outlined ethnicity and democracy or both, is religion as a cause for terrorism put forward, 'Muslim fanatics in the Middle East' in particular. Michael Radu (2001), senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute in the US, provides a simplification: democracy is declared un-Islamic by all ideologues of Islamic terrorism, Islamists hate capitalism and believe in a new Caliphate (who will lead the community of Muslims worldwide) and oppose individualism. Statistics reveal two relevant intriguing facets. One is religious revival in general, with the US at the top (Doyle, 2003), the other is statistics on killings (including from one murder to world wars) gathered and analysed by Lewis Fry Richardson (referenced in Hayes, 2001), among other factors, on the causality of violence and religion: "The one social factor that does have some detectable correlation with war is religion. ... nations that differ in religion are more likely to fight than those that share the same religion. Moreover, some sects seem generally to be more bellicose (Christian nations participated in a disproportionate number of conflicts). But these effects are not large." (Hayes, 2002:15)

Bear in mind though, that there are also a 'disproportionate' amount Christians. In turn, it can be argued that there are many Christians exactly because they 'seem generally to be more bellicose'.

Notwithstanding the above, all religions emphasise that one should treat others as we wish to be treated, and that one should not kill another human being (the latter with a few exceptions, e.g. Just War Theory). From an Islamic perspective, there are scholars who consider Western society, which is based on Christian theology, as the main cause of terrorism, and Darwinism and materialism in particular (Yahya, (1)), including Malthus' theory of ruthlessness, also known under the definition of social Darwinism. Last, New Age - as a religion - considers the perceived cause of terrorism the "modern society", being "too stressful and uncreative" (Ridgley, 1999), i.e. a problem within oneself.

Summarizing,

Among the multitude of causes that may lead a person to resort to terrorism, there is none that conclusively links a sole cause to the act. Ethnicity, nationalism/separatism, poverty and economic disadvantage, globalisation, (non)democracy, Western society, disaffected intelligentsia, dehumanisation, and religion all have arguments confirming a possible existing link, as well reservations against a causal relation.

Islamic Culpability

by: **Vernon Richards**

It is way past time to give it up people. We have tried to target various vile terrorists, while at the same time pumping up Islam, but its just not working. As we fight terrorists, we have been unable to face the stark reality that Islam, and the example of their revered prophet, are the chief motivation behind various terrorist foot-soldiers. It's not a 'culture', it's not a few deviants, it's not a government or nation, it's the religion. As we look first one way, and then the other, in-you-face Muslim leaders and lay continue their Jihad against us, pushing their young men to commit acts of inhumane brutality in the name of their hateful god Allah. Previously unthinkable news and images invades our living rooms on a daily basis. Only the dead and dumb can continue to hide from the facts surrounding a philosophy calling itself a religion, hell-bent on murdering or enslaving the rest of humanity. For those able to think, here is a news flash: The 9/11 hijackers, the London Bombers, the Beslan child-killers, the Chechen terrorists, the Palestinian terrorists, the Madrid terrorists, the Darfur killers, the Iraqi murderers, The Bali bombers, and innumerable acts of murder and carnage, are all linked. The common linkage, is that the victimizers are all devout Muslims! Yes, that wonderful 'religion of peace' we have been so careful to respect. And while the foot-soldiers act to weaken Wes-

tern influence and institutions, 'moderate Islam' continues to do what it does best, hide militants living amongst them and silently cheer from the sidelines. The common denominator in this equation of violence is ISLAM. The common script for all these violent plays is the Qur'an, the Sira, and the Hadith collection. The identical characters for all these ugly occurrences are devout Muslims well steeped in Islamic verse and prose.

In our need to believe all religion is good, we continue to place blame everywhere else, anywhere else, even ourselves, except where it is due. Naïve to the methods and history of Islam, most of us transfer our own religious experience onto undeserving Muslims, incorrectly assuming that going to the Mosque and more prayer will dissuade Muslims from acts of evil, when it works exactly the opposite. Whereas most religionists leave their places of worship more docile, reflective, and less likely to do harm to others, in Islam worshipers leave the Mosques on Friday and go on murderous riots to avenge some perceived slight. Never, NEVER, encourage a disturbed Muslim to read the Qur'an, or go to a mosque and pray. It is only when nominal Muslims actually learn the facts of who Muhammad actually was and what he expects, that they are at risk to become terrorists. Thank heaven most Muslims don't know too much of their own history and teachings, and it is best to keep it that way. Unfamiliarity and lack of dedication to the Torah and Bible prevents good Jews and Christians from becoming better men and women, but unfamiliarity and lack of dedication to the Qur'an prevents good Muslims from becoming bad Muslims.

For non-Muslims, self-preservation dictates that it is essential to become familiar with the actual teachings and example of Muhammad. Even if you don't know your own religion very well, or if you have no religion at all, each of us had better become knowledgeable of the philosophy and people bent on killing, converting, or enslaving us all. Without that armor of truth, our societies, cultures, and nations will eventually fall to Islam's methods and tactics. NO ONE should listen to the taqiyya (misinformation) constantly issued by Islamic apologists and propagandists. Each of us needs to take personal responsibility to know and understand the enemy seeking our demise. I suggest you start with my E-Book *Islam Undressed*, and move on to other sites like www.faithfreedom.org. To gain insight into the reality of Islam's culpability, consider the following article recently released:

CNN - Jul 20 2005 - Father of 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta warns of 50-year war. The father of one of the September 11 hijackers said today he had no sorrow for what had happened in London and claimed more terrorist attacks would follow. Egyptian Mohamed el-Amir, whose son Mohamed Atta commandeered the first plane that crashed into the World Trade Centre in New York, said there was a double standard in the way the world viewed the

victims in London and victims in the Islamic world. El-Amir said the attacks in the US and the July 7 attacks in Britain were the beginning of what would be a 50-year religious war, in which there would be many more fighters like his son. Speaking to a CNN producer in his apartment in the upper-middle-class Cairo suburb of Giza , he declared that terror cells around the world were a "nuclear bomb that has now been activated and is ticking". Cursing in Arabic, el-Amir also denounced Arab leaders and Muslims who condemned the London attacks as being traitors and non-Muslims. He passionately vowed that he would do anything within his power to encourage more attacks.

So after reading this; who is responsible for Mohammed Atta's acts on 9/11, does this revelation implicate his father? Certainly it makes it clear there was a family/culture component supporting the path he took, but from where in turn did his father derive his value system which he obviously instilled in his son, Mmmmm? Well, get a grip, and stop looking the other way, the manifest truth is that both the father and son have a clear grasp of real Islam, and they practice it! Stare it right in the face, and do not blink. They learned it from sacred Islamic scripture and from a lifetime at the mosque and listening to pious Imams. The father fears no backlash to his comments from his friends, neighbors, and Muslim countrymen because ...there is nothing to fear. The man receives more congratulations than condemnations. This from Egypt , a supposedly friendly nation who receives as much US aid as Israel . Hello, its Islam peoples! From the growing Muslim Brotherhood group in Egypt we get men like this, and the original terrorists who first attempted to bring down the NY Twin Towers. To travel into the minds of Muslims is like going to the land of OZ , everything is different, and much is manifestly evil. Be sure you have your ruby slippers on before going there, you will often feel the urge to click your heals three times and say; "there's no place like home ". When you get back, you will want a shower. If you are not Islamophobic yet, then you are either already dead, or stupid. Becoming Islamophobic is the graduation certificate you get upon moving from delusion and ignorance, to full-awareness. When you have arrived, wear it with pride.

The War on Terror Is the Leading Cause of Terrorism

By Kim Sengupta and Patrick Cockburn, *The Independent UK*

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<http://www.alternet.org/story/48620/>

Innocent people across the world are now paying the price of the "Iraq effect," with the loss of hundreds of lives directly linked to the invasion and occupation by American and British forces.

An authoritative U.S. study of terrorist attacks after the invasion in 2003 contradicts the repeated denials of George Bush and Tony Blair that the war is not to blame for an upsurge in fundamentalist violence worldwide. The research is said to be the first to attempt to measure the "Iraq effect" on global terrorism.

It found that the number killed in jihadist attacks around the world has risen dramatically since the Iraq war began in March 2003. The study compared the period between 11 September 2001 and the invasion of Iraq with the period since the invasion. The count -- excluding the Arab-Israel conflict -- shows the number of deaths due to terrorism rose from 729 to 5,420. As well as strikes in Europe, attacks have also increased in Chechnya and Kashmir since the invasion. The research was carried out by the Centre on Law and Security at the NYU Foundation for Mother Jones magazine.

Iraq was the catalyst for a ferocious fundamentalist backlash, according to the study, which says that the number of those killed by Islamists within Iraq rose from seven to 3,122. Afghanistan, invaded by US and British forces in direct response to the September 11 attacks, saw a rise from very few before 2003 to 802 since then. In the Chechen conflict, the toll rose from 234 to 497. In the Kashmir region, as well as India and Pakistan, the total rose from 182 to 489, and in Europe from none to 297.

Two years after declaring "mission accomplished" in Iraq President Bush insisted: "If we were not fighting and destroying the enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They would be plotting and killing Americans across the world and within our borders. By fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in uniform are defeating a direct threat to the American people."

Mr Blair has also maintained that the Iraq war has not been responsible for Muslim fundamentalist attacks such as the 7/7 London bombings which killed 52 people. "Iraq, the region and the wider world is a safer place without Saddam [Hussein]," Mr Blair declared in July 2004.

Announcing the deployment of 1,400 extra troops to Afghanistan earlier this week -- raising the British force level in the country above that in Iraq -- the Prime Minister steadfastly denied accusations by MPs that there was any link between the Iraq war and an unravelling of security elsewhere.

Last month John Negroponte, the Director of National Intelligence in Washington, said he was "not certain" that the Iraq war had been a recruiting factor for al-Qa'ida and insisted: "I wouldn't say that there has been a widespread growth in Islamic extremism beyond Iraq, I really wouldn't."

Yet the report points out that the US administration's own National Intelligence Estimate on "Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States" – partially declassified last October – stated that "the Iraq war has become the 'cause célèbre' for jihadists ... and is shaping a new generation of terrorist leaders and operatives."

The new study, by Peter Bergen and Paul Cruickshank, argues that, on the contrary, "the Iraq conflict has greatly increased the spread of al-Qa'ida ideological virus, as shown by a rising number of terrorist attacks in the past three years from London to Kabul, and from Madrid to the Red Sea.

"Our study shows that the Iraq war has generated a stunning increase in the yearly rate of fatal jihadist attacks, amounting to literally hundreds of additional terrorist attacks and civilian lives lost. Even when terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan is excluded, fatal attacks in the rest of the world have increased by more than one third."

In trying to gauge the "Iraq effect," the authors had focused on the rate of terrorist attacks in two periods – from September 2001 to 30 March 2003 (the day of the Iraq invasion) and 21 March 2003 to 30 September 2006. The research has been based on the MIPT-RAND Terrorism database.

The report's assertion that the Iraq invasion has had a far greater impact in radicalising Muslims is widely backed security personnel in the UK. Senior anti-terrorist officials told The Independent that the attack on Iraq, and the now-discredited claims by the U.S. and British governments about Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction, had led to far more young Muslims engaging in extremist activity than the invasion of Afghanistan two years previously.

Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the Secret Service (MI5) said recently: "In Iraq attacks are regularly videoed and the footage is downloaded into the internet.

"Chillingly, we see the results here. Young teenagers are being groomed to be suicide bombers. The threat is serious, is growing and will, I believe, be with us for a generation."

In Afghanistan the most active of the Taliban commanders, Mullah Dadullah, acknowledged how the Iraq war has influenced the struggle in Afghanistan.

"We give and take with the mujahedin in Afghanistan," he said. The most striking example of this has been the dramatic rise in suicide bombings in Afghanistan, a phenomenon not seen through the 10 years of war with the Russians in the 1980s.

The effect of Iraq on various jihadist conflicts has been influenced according to a number of factors, said the report. Countries with troops in Iraq, geographical proximity to the country, the empathy felt for the Iraqis and the exchange of information between Islamist groups.

"This may explain why jihadist groups in Europe, Arab countries, and Afghanistan were more affected by the Iraq war than other regions," it said.

Russia, like the US, has used the language of the "war on terror" in its actions in Chechnya, and al-Qa'ida and their associates have entrenched themselves in the border areas of Pakistan from where they have mounted attacks in Kashmir, Pakistan and India.

Statistics for the Arab-Israel conflict also show an increase, but the methodology is disputed in the case of Palestinian attacks in the occupied territories and settler attacks on Palestinians.

* The U.S. is joining the Iraqi government in a diplomatic initiative inviting Iran and Syria to a "neighbours meeting" on stabilising Iraq, the Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said yesterday. The move reflects a change of approach by the Bush administration, which previously had resisted calls to include Iran and Syria in such talks.

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Per T Ohlsson om terrorism

Lund 2006-01-31

Vid ett mycket välbesökt seminarium arrangerat av Timbro Syd var Sydsvenskans senior columnist Per T Ohlsson inbjuden för att tala om terrorism. Föreläsningen koncentrerades omkring den islamistiska terrorismen, dess orsaker och utbredning.

Per T Ohlsson inledde med att försöka göra den islamistiska terrorismen förståelig ur ett historiskt perspektiv. En lång rad terrordåd med islamistiska förtecken har de senaste sex, sju åren drabbat stora delar av världen. Ohlsson ser detta som en del av den tredje stora antimoderna protestvågen.

Den första vågen var 1800-talets romantiska konservatism där man drömde sig tillbaka till nationers svunna storhetstider, i Sverige klätt i vackra ord av bland andra Runeberg.

Den andra och betydligt blodigare vågen var den antidemokratiska totalitära vågen dominerad av bolsjevism, kommunism och fascism.

Den tredje vågen kännetecknas av en religiös fundamentalism. Den är ett svar på upplösningen av det traditionstyngda samhället. Sexuell frigörelse, jämställdhet, och ökad personlig frihet är bara några saker som hotar det traditionella samhället i globaliseringens tid. Religiösa krafter som i många fall har varit traditionernas upprätthållare svarar med en ökad fundamentalism.

Speciellt stark har den tredje protestvågen varit i den muslimdominerade delen av världen. Enligt Ohlsson beror detta främst på att denna del av världen konsekvent har motsatt sig alla reformer mot ett öppnare och mer upplyst samhälle. Han grundar bland annat påståendet på FN's Arab Human Development Report, författad av framstående arabiska forskare, som fastslår att arabvärlden är den minst öppna och mest frihetsbegränsande delen av världen. Den bristande fri- och öppenheten har givit en god grogrund för islamism.

Det riktigt kusliga med islamismen är att det finns en tydlig koppling mellan den och den andra totalitära vågen. Islamistiska ledargestalter är ofta inspirerade av stalinismen och nazismen. Ideologin uppmanar till massmord och utplåning av politiska och religiösa oliktankare. Målet är en apokalyptisk utopi. Döds- och offerkulten är utbredd. Al Qaidas hotfulla tal innehåller exempelvis ofta formuleringar som "Ni älskar livet, vi älskar döden!"

Vanligt förekommande förklaringar till den islamistiska terrorn blir inte så sällan till ursäkter för terrorattacker. Ohlsson finner förklaringarna både förkastliga och felaktiga. En sådan förklaring är att västvärlden nu straffas för sitt oreserverade stöd till Israel. Att Israel/Palestina-konflikten underlättar rekryteringen till terrororganisationer ligger det en sanning i. Men konflikten har inget att göra med kärnan i den islamistiska terrorn, enligt Ohlsson. Han stöder sig här bland annat på ett av Usama bin Ladens uttalanden i förbindelse med 9/11, om att USA nu får smaka på den förnedring som bin Ladens folk har fått utstå de senaste åttio åren. För åttio år sedan fanns inte staten Israel. Det bin Laden syftar på är det Ottomanska väldets sammanbrott som följd av nederlaget i Första Världskriget och kalifatets upplösning som blev total när Atatürk förbjöd det 1924.

Bin Ladens och hans likars mål är primärt att förena de muslimska länderna och införa ett nytt kalifat i en förenad islamistisk nation. Således kopplas islamismen även till den första antimoderna vågen, drömmen om forna storhetstider.

”Israel ligger ivägen, det är sant och USA står ivägen, det är sant”, sade Ohlsson. Men det är varken Israel eller USA som är orsak till islamistisk terror.

USA´s FN-stödda intervention i Afghanistan framförs också som en förklaring till islamistisk terrorism. Men interventionen skedde efter 9/11 2001 och den skedde efter de två första stora terrorattentaten mot de amerikanska ambassaderna i Tanzania och Kenya 1998, för övrigt samma år som Israel och Palestina var mycket nära att förhandla fram ett nytt och mycket omfattande avtal.

Kriget i Irak framförs likaså som orsak till terrorismen. De allierade trupperna gick in i mars 2003. Men redan 2002 gick det en våg av terrorattacker i bland annat Bali och Mombasa. Även Turkiet som motsatte sig en nordlig front i angreppen på Saddams diktatur, utsattes för terrorattacker.

Det tycks uppenbart att målet med terrorattacken i Madrid var att få Spanien att dra sig ur alliansen. Men det har visat sig i senare polisundersökningar att de som genomförde attacken planerade nya attacker i Spanien, även efter tillbakadragandet av spanska trupper.

En annan typ av förklaring till islamistisk terrorism som Ohlsson lyfte fram, är att terrorism på något vis är inbyggd i islam. Mot detta invände han att alla religioner bär frö inom sig till terrorhandlingar. Men islam är inte en mer terrorvänlig religion än andra. Självordsattentat har exempelvis inget stöd i islam. Profeten Mohammed vägrade själv att be för folk som tog sitt eget liv.

De allra flesta människorna vill leva i fred och frihet. Muslimerna utgör inget undantag. Undersökningar visar exempelvis att nio av tio muslimer föredrar demokrati som styresform. Terroristerna går inte det muslimska folkets ärende. Deras mål är att sprida död och förödelse, för att ur kaoset kunna bygga upp en islamistisk stat.